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The purpose of the study was to confirm a model which proposed two basic dimensions
in the subjective experience of guilt, one anxious-aggressive and the other empathic, as
well as another dimension associated but not intrinsic to it, namely, the associated negative
emotions dimension. Participants were 360 adolescents, young adults and adults of both
sexes. They were asked to relate one of the situations that most frequently caused them
to experience feelings of guilt and to specify its intensity and that of 9 other emotions
that they may have experienced, to a greater or lesser extent, at the same time on a 7-
point scale. The proposed model was shown to adequately fit the data and to be better
than other alternative nested models. This result supports the views of both Freud and
Hoffman regarding the nature of guilt, contradictory only at a first glance.
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El objetivo de este estudio fue confirmar un modelo que proponía dos dimensiones
básicas de le experiencia subjetive de la culpa, una ansiosa-agresiva y la otra empática,
además de otra dimensión asociada pero no intrínseca a la culpa, es decir, la dimensión
de las emociones negativas asociadas. Participaron en el estudio 360 adolescentes,
jóvenes y adultos de ambos sexos. Se les pidió que relataran una de las situaciones
que les hacían sentirse culpables con mayor frecuencia y que especificaran su intensidad
y la de otras 9 emociones que hubieran podido experimentar, en mayor o menor grado,
al mismo tiempo en una escala de 7 puntos. El modelo propuesto se ajustaba a los datos
y se observó que era mejor que otros modelos alternativos anidados. Este resultado
apoya los puntos de vista tanto de Freud como de Hoffman con respecto a la naturaleza
de la culpa, sólo aparentemente contradictorios.
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After a long period of neglect, the study of guilt has once
again become the object of much attention over the last
decade. From the 1990s onwards, a number of theoretical
and empirical studies have focused on fundamental aspects
of this emotion such as the cognitive content of the
experience and its actual antecedents (Frijda, 1993; Kroon,
1988), its interpersonal roots and functions (Baumeister,
Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Berndsen, van der Pligt,
Doosje, & Manstead, 2004; Jones, Kugler, & Adams, 1995),
the difference between guilt and shame and the implications
of such differences (Abe, 2004; Buss, 1980, 2001; Lewis,
1971; Lewis, 2000; Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002;
Tangney, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins,
2004), its early development (Barret, 1998; Ferguson &
Stegge, 1995; Kochanska, Gross, Lin, & Nichols, 2002; Zahn-
Waxler & Kochanska, 1990; Zahn-Waxler & Robinson, 1995)
and its relation with psychopathology (Bybee & Quiles, 1998;
Harder, 1995; Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995), etc.
Nevertheless, hardly any research has been carried out on
an equally important question: the emotional quality of the
subjective experience of guilt. What is the nature of the most
common experience of guilt? What emotional components
are involved? Are there clearly differentiated types?
Although empirical research is scarce, theoretical
approaches to the emotional quality of the subjective
experience of guilt abound. However, these theoretical
approaches vary widely, resulting in a somewhat confusing
theoretical panorama. Our aim when designing this study
was to provide empirical data to help clarify the
aforementioned panorama. The following is a brief overview
of the most notable theoretical approaches.
Firstly, we should highlight those theories postulated by
Freud, who dedicated many of his analyses to unraveling
the nature and effects of feelings of guilt. According to Freud
(1923/1961, 1930/1961), at first, the feeling of guilt
(Schuldgefühl) is nothing more than the anxiety felt by a
child in response to the loss of parents’ love when s/he fails
to behave as they would like. After the development of the
superego as the result of the internalization of parental
values, the feeling of guilt has a twofold origin: anxiety
over external authority and anxiety caused by the severe
vigilance of the superego. When the individual acts or feels
the impulse to act in a way which contravenes the mandates
of the superego, the superego berates that person with harsh
criticism; in order to avoid these recriminations, the
individual ends up capitulating to the dictates of the
superego. According to Freud, the aggressiveness that the
superego unleashes onto the ego, perceived by the ego as
a feeling of guilt, originates not only from the real severity
of the individual’s parents; it also stems from the individual’s
own aggressiveness, from both his/her original aggressiveness
and that provoked by the frustration of his/her desires, which
the subject has been forced to repress. In addition to acting
as a powerful inhibitory factor, feelings of guilt also produce
the need for punishment, a need which tends to be translated
into self-punishment. Furthermore, given its extremely
unpleasant nature, the individual tends to set in motion
numerous defense mechanisms (rationalizations, projections,
reaction-formations, etc.). As a result, feelings of guilt end
up manifesting themselves in a wide variety of different
ways, to the extent that the individual him/herself often fails
to recognize them for what they are, experiencing them as
anxiety and floating aggressiveness (most commonly directed
at him/herself, but often turned outwards also) whose origin
the person is unable to identify. In any case, these feelings
of guilt constitute an underlying factor in much pathology
(depression, obsessive-compulsive disorders, etc.).
Klein (1973) agrees with most of Freud’s analyses, but
also identifies a different type of guilt. In addition to
persecutory guilt, very similar in nature to the Freudian guilt
described above, this author also identifies depressive guilt.
This type of guilt does not consist so much of anxiety
regarding the feared object as of sadness and regret at having
harmed the beloved object. More than feeling accused, an
individual experiencing this kind of guilt feels responsible
for the harm done to the beloved object, harm that needs to
be redressed. Another author such as Fromm (1947/1985)
proposes a new distinction: that between authoritarian guilt
and humanistic guilt. The first is confused with fear of
authority (parents, state, Church) which is either external
or internalized within the individual’s own consciousness
and implies aggressiveness, stemming from frustration, which
is constantly directed towards oneself. The second is defined
as the feeling derived from not having acted in accordance
with one’s own dignity, of not having risen to the occasion.
Learning theories have also striven to shed light on the
nature of guilt. In relation to this approach, we can highlight
the work of Eysenck and Mosher. Eysenck (1964/1977)
conceived guilt as a conditioned emotional disturbance.
Guilty reactions are simply due to a Pavlovian conditioning
process: if punishment is applied before, or at the start, of
the transgression, then resistance to the transgression is
generated; however, if punishment is applied once the
transgression has been committed, then the result is feelings
of guilt. Mosher (1965) also associates guilt with anxiety,
defining it as a “generalized expectancy for self-mediated
punishment (i.e., negative reinforcement [sic]) for the
violating, anticipating the violation of, or failure to attain
internalized standards of proper behavior” (p. 162).
Alongside the theories mentioned above, special mention
should be made of that postulated by Hoffman (1982, 1998),
one of the few authors that continued to work in this field
during the 1980s and whose work still strongly influences
current thinking. From Hoffman’s perspective, guilt (or more
specifically, the guilt that he terms true or interpersonal
guilt, in order to distinguish it from Freudian guilt) is
intrinsically linked with empathy. When an individual feels
empathic pain and sees him/herself as being responsible for
another person’s pain, then the empathic experience tends
to transform itself into guilt. This constitutes a fundamental
ETXEBARRIA AND APODACA160
prosocial motive, since it fosters reparatory behavior and
all types of positive behaviors that transcend to the victim. 
Finally, among the more recent approaches, we should
highlight those postulated by Baumeister et al. (1994). Based
on a comprehensive review of empirical research, as well
as on their own studies, these authors postulate an
interpersonal conception of guilt. From this perspective,
guilt is rooted, on the one hand, in the human capacity to
feel others’ pain, and on the other, in anxiety over rejection
by others. Thus, guilt appears mainly in relation to actions
or omissions which cause real or possible pain to others,
particularly those closest to us, and plays a decisive role in
the control and reparation of the said actions. Frijda (1993),
in his analysis of the cognitive content and actual antecedents
of guilt experiences, proposes a similar view.
The wide range of different conceptions of guilt, briefly
outlined above, in conjunction with the need identified by
several authors to establish distinctions between different
types, as well as the fact that the distinctions do not always
coincide, suggest that we are faced with a complex family
of emotions. Nevertheless, if we compare the various
approaches, we see that different authors coincide in
highlighting certain types of guilt. In this way, in spite of
terminological differences, Freudian approaches, Klein’s
ideas regarding persecutory guilt, Fromm’s perspective
regarding authoritarian guilt, and even Eysenck and other
learning theorists’ proposals regarding conditioned anxiety
responses resulting from educational practices are, in fact,
fairly similar. In all cases we are dealing with a feeling of
guilt that is confused with anxiety over the reaction of more
or less internalized others, a feeling of guilt that, according
to some authors (particularly those from the psychoanalytic
field), is also marked by contained aggressiveness turned
inwards against the ego. Alongside this type of guilt, Klein
stresses the existence of depressive guilt, a concept which
prefigures the true or interpersonal guilt later proposed by
Hoffman. In this case, guilt is associated with empathy over
another’s pain. Baumeister and colleagues propose a kind
of synthesis of these two aforementioned conceptions,
emphasizing the participation of both empathy and anxiety
over external rejection in the experience of guilt.
In sum, guilt has basically been associated with two
emotions: empathy and anxiety. Everything seems to point
to the existence of some experiences of guilt in which the
predominant emotion is empathy, and others in which the
prevailing feeling is that of anxiety, and that, to a large
extent, the discrepancy between different theories is due to
the fact that the researchers are focusing on different types
of experiences of guilt. Furthermore, some authors also
coincide in that anxious guilt often involves a fair amount
of contained aggressiveness, directed inwards against oneself.
Alongside the above mentioned emotional components, a
number of authors have also highlighted the role played by
a depressive component in all experiences of guilt: Freud
mentions it in his analysis of anxious guilt, and Klein
considers it to be a fundamental element in depressive guilt
–empathic guilt. 
To what extent are these theoretical approaches valid?
How faithful a reflection are they of real subjective
experiences of guilt? Despite the number of studies on the
emotional correlates of the tendency to experience guilt or
trait guilt, studies focusing on the emotional correlates of
the experience of guilt in response to a specific event, or
state guilt, are still scarce. Nevertheless, as we will see
below, existing studies support the fundamental presence of
empathy, anxiety, aggressiveness and sadness in experiences
of guilt. 
With regard to the empathic component, after analyzing
child and adult autobiographical reports of emotional
experiences, Tangney, Marschall, Rosenberg, Barlow, and
Wagner (1996) found that when relating episodes in which
they had experienced feelings of guilt, both groups often
expressed other-oriented empathy. An experimental study
carried out by Hoffman (Thompson & Hoffman, 1980) also
supports the presence of an empathic component in the
feeling of guilt. Similarly, significant positive correlations
have been found between the tendency to experience other-
oriented empathy and the tendency to experience guilt in
sample groups of various ages (Tangney, 1991; Tangney,
Wagner, Burggraf, Gramzow, & Fletcher, 1991). Finally,
studies which show a close relationship between the tendency
to experience feelings of guilt and the use by parents of
inductive disciplinary techniques –techniques which activate
empathy and foster its development– also provide indirect
empirical support for the association between guilt and
empathy (Etxebarria, 1994; Hoffman, 1994, 2000).
As for the other emotional components whose
implication in the experience of guilt has been highlighted
by diverse theories, a study carried out by Baumeister, Reis,
and Delespaul (1995), using an experience sampling method
over the course of a week in order to determine the
frequency with which people experience guilt and the
emotions that are associated with this experience, supports
the presence of anxiety, aggressiveness and sadness in guilt
episodes. Similarly, studies which analyze various correlates
of the Guilt Inventory have found that both state guilt and
trait guilt are associated with anxiety, hostility and depression
(Jones & Kugler, 1993; Jones et al., 1995).
In a number of studies with adult subjects, Watson and
Clark (1992) also found strong correlations between guilt
and hostility, sadness, and fear. Nevertheless, in these studies,
most data was based on relatively long-term measures of
the affect, rendering the results more relevant in relation to
trait guilt than in connection with state guilt. In any case,
in the first of these studies, the authors used measurements
of current, momentary affect in two variables, anxiety (STAI
A-State) and anger/hostility (STAS), finding a very high
correlation between the two. This result deserves special
attention in relation to the perspectives that attribute to
anxious guilt an important aggressive component. 
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However, the relationship between guilt and
aggressiveness is far from clear. Different studies support
a negative relationship between trait guilt and a tendency
toward outwardly directed anger and hostility (Lutwak,
Panish, Ferrari, & Razzino, 2001; Mosher, 1979; Tangney,
Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 2001). According to Tangney
(1995), this is due to the fact that, although the tendency
towards guilt, like the tendency towards shame, is associated
with the activation of anger, people who tend to experience
shame-free guilt (as opposed to those who tend to experience
shame) also tend to handle it in a constructive manner: they
show constructive intentions, attempts to discuss the issue
in a non-aggressive way with the person at whom their anger
is directed, cognitive reevaluations of the other person’s role
in the situation of anger, etc. Nevertheless, the negative
relationship between trait guilt and a tendency towards anger
and hostility could also be interpreted as a reflection of the
tendency of guilt-prone people to direct their aggressiveness
against themselves, something which, in the long term, may
not prove particularly adaptive. 
Although shame-free guilt may be associated with
constructive handling of anger, the presence of an
intropunitive component is tangible in many experiences of
guilt (Kroon, 1988). This is particularly true when the
individual is unable to resolve the situation that has given
rise to the experience of guilt through confession, reparation
or asking for forgiveness, and the experience of guilt remains
therefore in a state of unresolved tension (Lindsay-Hartz,
de Rivera, & Mascolo, 1995). The presence of an (outwardly
and inwardly directed) aggressive component has also been
identified in cases of so-called chronic guilt. Based on the
distinction between predispositional guilt (predisposition to
feel guilty in response to specific events) and chronic guilt
(an ongoing condition not associated with immediate events),
Bybee and Quiles (1998) found that individuals suffering
from more chronic guilt also showed higher levels of
hostility and more intropunitive behavior. This data indicates
the presence of an other-oriented and self-aggressive
component in some types of guilt. Nevertheless, more studies
focusing on state guilt, such as those carried out by
Baumeister et al. (1995), are required in order to enable
conclusions to be drawn regarding the presence of aggressive
components in habitual experiences of guilt. 
Based on the theoretical review and the empirical studies
mentioned above, in this current study we formulated the
hypothesis that, fundamentally, the components of anxiety,
aggressiveness, empathy and sadness would be involved in
habitual experiences of guilt, although the anxious and
aggressive components would tend to be more intense in
some cases, and the empathic component more intense in
others. In other words, we hypothesized that two basic
clearly differentiated factors would be involved in
experiences of guilt: one that would correspond, to a large
extent, with the guilt described by Freud, mainly covering
the feelings of anxiety, anger and anger at oneself (anxious-
aggressive factor); and another that would basically
correspond to the guilt described by Hoffman, involving the
feeling of sympathy (empathic factor). A sadness component
would intervene in both factors, although with less weight
than the aforementioned emotional components.
In addition to attempting to confirm the existence of
these two factors, we also aimed to determine the extent to
which components of other emotions such as disgust, fear,
shame and sense of worthlessness, were involved, and
present, in experiences of guilt. The above review suggests
that, although in some cases they may be associated with
experiences of guilt and can even be fairly intense, these
emotional components do not constitute essential elements.
Therefore, we supposed that these emotions would tend to
be grouped in a factor different from the two previously-
described ones: namely the associated negative emotions
factor. Although clearly distinguishable from the anxious-
aggressive factor and the empathic factor, given the highly
aversive nature of its components, this third factor would
show a fairly close association with the anxious-aggressive
factor, while showing no, or a very low, covariation with
the empathic factor.
In this type of research, both cultural and social elements
play an important role, thus necessitating some prior
clarifications regarding the study presented here. Said study
aimed to confirm the three-factor model of guilt described
above. The objective was to see whether indeed this model
properly encompassed the underlying dimensions of guilt
as experienced in everyday life. Thus, the best idea seemed
to be to ask a large number of people to report their habitual
experiences of guilt without giving them any prior definition
of said emotion. In this way, the aim was not to limit what
people habitually understood by guilt with any academic a
priori. Nevertheless, a problem may arise here: how can we
be sure that people would report experiences of guilt rather
than those of other closely-related emotions, such as shame,
for example? In the English-speaking context, it has been
stated on more than one occasion that lay-people often
confuse guilt and shame (Tangney, 1995; Tangney &
Dearing, 2002). This may indeed be a problem in a study
involving English-speaking participants; however, in the
Spanish context, people do not tend to have so much
difficulty distinguishing between culpa and vergüenza (the
Spanish terms for guilt and shame, respectively). A recent
study by Pascual, Etxebarria and Pérez (2007) suggests that
the limits between the Spanish terms culpa and vergüenza
are less diffuse than the limits between the English terms
guilt and shame. Similarly, other authors (Hurtado de
Mendoza, 2007; Hurtado de Mendoza & Parrott, 2002) have
found that the distance between vergüenza –to be even more
precise, the Spanish vergüenza, as opposed to the
Guatemalan vergüenza– and culpa is greater than the distance
between shame and guilt.
However, we should not overlook another problem here,
perhaps even more important than the one outlined above.
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When we ask people about their experience of culpa, what
we are verifying is whether the dimensions proposed by our
model underlie the experiences that Spanish people consider
to be experiences of culpa, not whether said dimensions
underlie experiences of guilt per se. Furthermore, we cannot
suppose an exact correspondence between the Spanish term
culpa and the English term guilt (Hurtado de Mendoza,
2007; Hurtado de Mendoza & Parrott, 2002; Pascual et al.,
2007). Does this mean that we are studying a culturally-
specific emotional experience? A variant of guilt that, as
such, would not be worth using to confirm a general model
of this emotion? Not at all; the experience of culpa is not
a culturally-specific emotional experience or, to be more
precise, it is no more so than the experience of guilt of
English-speaking participants in studies of this kind.
Although there is a certain degree of (often unconscious)
ethnocentrism that prevents us from seeing it, many other
studies carried out in other cultures, including English-
speaking ones, pose the same problem. As some authors
have pointed out (Russell, 1991; Russell, Fernández-Dols,
Manstead, & Wellenkamp, 1995), when we study guilt,
Schuldgefühl or culpa, what we are studying, at least with
this type of method, is what the people from the
corresponding culture understand by the term, rather than
a universal emotion whose psychological essence is, by
coincidence, embodied in the English term guilt, the German
term Schuldgefühl or the Spanish term culpa. Having said
this, we believe the use of self reports, even with all their
limitations, continues to be a useful tool for analyzing
subjective questions such as the one that is the focus of this
paper.
Having made these clarifications, and despite the fact
that the Spanish term does not correspond exactly with the
English term guilt or the German term Schuldgefühl, our
hypothesis, as stated earlier, is that the factors postulated
by the theory would be confirmed by the data obtained in
the Spanish context.
Method
Participants
Participants were 360 people from three age groups: one
group of 156 adolescents aged between 15 and 19 (81 girls
and 75 boys, mean age = 16.87 years), another group of 96
young adults aged between 25 and 33 (49 women and 47
men, mean age = 28 years), and a third group of 108 adults
aged between 40 and 50 (54 women and 54 men, mean age
= 44.69 years). The predominating religious tendency was
Catholic or generally Christian, although the vast majority
were non churchgoers. They voluntarily participated in the
study and were treated in accordance with the Ethical
Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (American
Psychological Association, 1992).
Instrument and Procedure
Participants responded to a questionnaire in which they
were asked to describe, in a certain amount of detail, one
of the situations which most frequently caused them to
experience feelings of guilt (culpa). After reporting why this
made them feel guilty, they had to specify the intensity of
the feeling of guilt on a 7-point scale (1 = no guilt, 7 = very
intense guilt). Then, there was a list of 9 emotional
experiences where they had to indicate whether they
experienced one or more of these feelings, in addition to
guilt, in the situation they had mentioned. They specified
the intensity of these feelings on a scale similar to the
previous one at the side of each of the listed emotions. The
list was as follows: “I feel sorry for another person”, “I feel
nervous, anxious”, “I feel angry with myself”, “I feel
irritated, angry”, “I feel worthless”, “I feel sad”, “I feel
disgusted”, “I feel frightened”, “I feel ashamed” and, finally,
“any other emotion.”
The students answered the questionnaire in their
classrooms during class. The young adults and adults
responded to the questionnaire individually at home. 
Data Analysis
To test the hypotheses relating to the structure of the
subjective experience of guilt (culpa), we used a
confirmatory factor analytic (CFA) procedure, which is based
on the analysis of covariance structures, using the AMOS
program (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999).
However, we should not forget that “[...] the data do not
confirm a model, they only fail to disconfirm it, [...] when
the data do not disconfirm a model, there are many other
models that are not disconfirmed either” (Cliff, 1983, p.
116-117). Furthermore, the Chi-square goodness-of-fit test
is the main procedure of parameter significance for the
analysis of covariance structures. This test, although valuable,
is problematic because it is a direct function of sample size,
it decreases as the model becomes less parsimonious and it
increases as the covariances of the matrix become higher
(Apodaca & Páez, 1992). Currently, it is more useful when
regarded as a measure of fit rather than as a statistic test
(Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993).
Based on this, we decided to test different nested models.
Our aim was to demonstrate that our theoretical model fitted
better than other models. Therefore, we tried to test our
model in relative terms (as better than other alternative
models) rather than in absolute terms (through a test of
statistical significance).
Models. The main model regarding the structure of the
subjective experience of guilt (theoretical model - Mt)
hypothesized a priori that (a) it would be described by three
factors, two basic factors (the “Empathic” and “Anxious-
aggressive” factors) and another factor of “Associated
negative emotions”; (b) the first factor –the Empathic one–
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would show very low correlations with the other two factors
while the second and the third factors would show a high
correlation; (c) the “sadness” emotion would have two
nonzero loadings (one in the Empathic and the other in the
Anxious-aggressive factors) while the rest of the emotions
would have only one nonzero loading; (d) specifically, the
Empathic factor would include sympathy and sadness, the
Anxious-aggressive factor would include sadness, anxiety,
anger and anger at oneself, and the Associated negative
emotions factor would include fear, disgust, shame and a
sense of worthlessness.
This theoretical model was compared with other nested
models to determine whether or not its fit was better. These
models were as follows: (a) M0 - Independence, (b) M1 -
One-factor model, (c) M2 - Two-factor model, (d) M31 -
Three-factor model-Alternative 1, and (e) M32 - Three-factor
model-Alternative 2.
Goodness-of-fit criteria. The evaluation of the model
was based on multiple criteria, mainly the substantive
meaningfulness of the model, but also Chi-squared likelihood
ratio statistics and other practical indexes of fit (absolute,
comparative and cross-validation fit indexes). A more
detailed description of the indexes now follows:
1. The Chi-square test of the overall differences
between nested models. This difference is calculated
by simple subtraction of the chi-square statistics of
the nested models. This difference is distributed as
chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the
difference in degrees of freedom between the
models.
2. The Goodness-of-fit index (GFI) is an absolute index
of fit because it compares the hypothesized model
with no model at all.
3. The Root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA) is considered an important informative
criterion. This index is expressed per degrees of
freedom and is therefore sensitive to the complexity
of the model and useful for comparing alternative
(non-nested) models. Steiger (1989) suggests the use
of confidence intervals to assess the precision of the
RMSEA estimates.
4. The comparative fit index (CFI), proposed by Bentler
(1990), is useful for comparing nested models. It
compares the hypothesized model with a base model
that is usually the independence model. This index is
sensitive to the complexity of the model. Both Cheung
and Rensvold (2002) and Elosua (2005) suggest that
when the difference between two nested models in
this coefficient is higher than .01, the most restricted
model should be rejected. 
5. Fit indexes for comparing non-nested models.
Akaike’s information criteria (AIC) and the expected
cross-validation index (ECVI) are useful for ordering
models from best fitting to worst fitting (Maruyama,
1998).
Model identification and latent factor scales definition.
The Empathic factor in models of two and three factors
(M2, Mt, M31, M32) with only two indicators and the
sadness item also loading on the Anxious-aggressive factor
could cause the under-identification of the model. To solve
this problem the loading of sympathy is set to 1 (as the
main component of the Empathic factor) and the loading
of sadness is set to 0.5 (as a secondary component of the
Anxious-aggressive factor). These decisions are congruent
with the substantive criteria mentioned above. For the
definition of latent factor scales the loadings of one item
per factor are set to 1.
The final sample size was 271 in order to ensure that
we were working with the complete data (as recommended
in structural equation methods) and to prevent a nonpositive
definite covariance matrix.
The theoretical model shows a number of
characteristics that limit the power of the analyses. The
difficulties basically arise from the limited number of
indicators of each dimension, which is a reflection of the
theoretical views on the nature of the subjective
experience of guilt. However, the biases found in the
simulation studies carried out by Marsh, Kit-Tai, Balla,
and Grayson (1998) indicate an acceptable precision level
with Ns and number of indicators per factor similar to
those considered in our study. Furthermore, the strategy
of testing nested models lends additional consistency to
the estimates. Nevertheless, it will be necessary to analyze
the confidence interval for the RMSEA and the ECVI, in
order to assess the precision of the estimates under these
circumstances. 
Finally, one last statistical consideration should be
mentioned, regarding the normality of the distributions.
We analyzed the asymmetry and kurtosis coefficients in
each of the variables and, as shown in Table 2, the
distributions were reasonably close to normal (Muthén &
Kaplan, 1985) and are within the limits recommended by
various authors for these analyses (Cuttance & Ecob,
1987). 
Results
Intensity of the Different Emotional Components
Involved in the Subjective Experience of Guilt
The analysis of the means and standard deviations of
the different emotional components clearly showed that, as
we had hypothesized, the components that intervened most
intensely in the experience of guilt were sympathy, sadness,
anxiety, anger and anger at oneself. The other emotions
(fear, disgust, shame and sense of worthlessness) were found
with a much lower intensity. See Table 1.
These results were consistent with our model, in which
these last components were considered to be collateral. 
Testing the Three-Factor-Model 
The correlation matrix to be analyzed is presented in
Table 2.
We tested the validity of the theoretical three-factor
model in two ways. Firstly, by evaluating its degree of fit
to the data by means of the different fit indexes and the
consistency of the estimated parameters with what had been
hypothesized. And secondly, by comparing that model with
other nested models.
Figure 1 shows the theoretical model (Mt) with the
standardized estimates of the factor loadings and the
intercorrelations between the factors. The fit indexes are
shown in Table 3.
The diagram shows factor loadings that are consistent with
the proposed hypothesis. As we can see, the Empathic
dimension mainly includes the feeling of sympathy, with the
feeling of sadness also being present but with less weight. The
Anxious-aggressive dimension mainly includes anxiety, anger
and anger at oneself, with sadness also present but again, with
less weight. There is a very low covariation between the two
dimensions, a finding which is consistent with the theoretical
proposals that identify two clearly differentiated and independent
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Table 1
Mean, Standard Deviation, Asymmetry, and Kurtosis for each of the Variables 
Age Group N                              M                          SD Asymmetry             Kurtosis
Sympathy 299 4.18 1.89 –.27 –1.03
Sadness 314 4.37 1.83 –.30 –.92
Anxiety 306 4.04 1.88 –.05 –1.14
Anger 304 4.01 1.83 –.03 –1.09
Anger at oneself 329 4.78 1.65 –.45 –.67
Fear 279 2.57 1.90 .96 –.35
Disgust 277 2.40 1.77 1.13 .19
Shame 289 3.12 1.90 .48 –.95
Sense of worthlessness 286 2.88 1.91 .71 –.71
Table 2
Intercorrelations for all the Variables 
Sympathy    Sadness Anxiety Anger Anger Fear       Disgust Shame Sense of 
at oneself                                           worthlessness
Guilt .167** .338** .345** .312** .405** .119 .200** .145* .304**
Sympathy                       — .306** .118 .067 .047 .062 .139* .112 .031
Sadness                                   — .218** .349** .371** .340** .349** .295** .404**
Anxiety                                  — .412** .387** .381** .257** .186** .321**
Anger                                                                   — .540** .270** .484** .277** .397**
Anger at oneself                                                                  — .232** .247** .258** .395**
Fear                                                                  — .335** .310** .385**
Disgust — .328** .459**
Shame — .331**
Sense of worthlessness —
* p < .05. ** p < .01.
Figure 1. Mt - Three-factor model (Theoretical model); standardized
estimates.
factors. As regards the third factor, the Associated negative
emotions factor, the coefficients in Figure 1 show that it has
good internal consistency, as well as correlations with the other
factors in accordance with what had been hypothesized.
As shown in Table 3, the set of fit statistics corresponding
to the Mt model is satisfactory and supports the proposed
model. Both the GFI and the CFI are satisfactory although
moderate. The RMSEA index is within the limits of what
can be considered acceptable. The confidence intervals to
assess the precision of the RMSEA and ECVI estimates are
presented in order to show the stability of these estimates.
As we can see, the confidence interval for the RMSEA
oscillates between .06 and .10. The highest limit is above
what is considered good fit or reasonable errors of
approximation, but its range is sufficiently narrow to rely on
the precision of that fit index. The interval of the ECVI is
also narrow enough to rely on its precision.
In conclusion, we can say that the fit between the
theoretical three-factor model and data is moderately good,
although it is clear that modifying some parameters of the
model would improve that fit considerably. This, in fact, is
something we will do at a later stage. 
As stated above, the second level of analysis to test the
validity of the model is its comparison with other nested
models.  Table 3 shows the fit indexes of these models.
Table 4 shows the test of significance for the differences
between models.
As we can see, the three-factor model or theoretical
model (Mt) is clearly superior in its fit than the one-factor
and two-factor models. The one-factor model (M1) presents
really poor fit indexes: both the absolute index (GFI) and
the comparative one (CFI) are below the limits considered
acceptable. As regards the two-factor model (M2), the fit
indexes are somewhat better but they are also below what
is considered acceptable. Figure 2 shows the estimates
corresponding to the two-factor model.
This two-factor model is especially interesting because
it groups in a single factor two of the factors of the
theoretical model, the Anxious-aggressive factor and the
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Table 3
Fit Indexes for Nested Models
Model χ2 (df) GFI                RMSEA (lo-hi) CFI AIC              ECVI (lo-hi)
M0 586.4 (36) .558 .238 (.22-.25) .000 604.4 2.24 (1.96-2.54)
M1 103.5 (27) .927 .102 (.08-.12) .861 139.5 .52 (.41-.65)
M2 83.1 (26) .939 .090 (.07-.11) .896 121.1 .45 (.36-.56)
Mt 64.9 (24) .953 .079 (.06-.10) .926 106.9 .40 (.32-.50)
M31 30.9 (21) .976 .042 (.00-.07) .982 78.9 .29 (.26-.36)
M32 118.8 (25) .920 .118 (.10-.14) .830 158.8 .59 (.48-.73)
Note. M0 - Independence model; M1 = One-factor model; M2 = Two-factor model; Mt = Three-factor model = Theoretical model;
M31 = Three-factor model-Alternative 1; M32 = Three-factor model-Alternative 2; GFI = goodness of fit index; RMSEA = root mean
square error of approximation and 90% confidence interval; CFI = comparative fit index; AIC = Akaike’s information index; ECVI
= expected cross-validation index and 90% confidence interval.
Table 4
Hierarchical ∆χ2 Test between Nested Models
Model ∆χ2 ∆df p
M1-M2 20.4 1 < .01
M2-Mt 18.2 2 < .01
M32-Mt 53.9 1 < .01
Note. M1 = One-factor model; M2 = Two-factor model; Mt =
Three-factor model  = Theoretical model; M32 = Three-factor
model-Alternative 2. Figure 2. M2 - Two-factor model; standardized estimates.
Associated negative emotions factor. As mentioned above,
the emotions included in the Associated negative emotions
factor can only be considered collateral or not part of the
most intrinsic elements of guilt. Nevertheless, from an
empirical perspective, they present correlation patterns that
could call their merely collateral character into question.
Indeed, as shown in Figure 1, the correlation of the
Associated negative emotions factor with the Anxious-
aggressive factor is .81. We tested a two-factor model with
the aim of helping to clarify these empirical correlation
patterns and understand what exactly these associated
negative emotions represent in relation to the experience of
guilt from a conceptual perspective.
The comparison between the two models (Mt - M2)
supports the need to distinguish between the Associated
negative emotions factor and the Anxious-aggressive factor
since the three-factor model is clearly superior to the two-
factor model in all fit indexes, as well as in the test of
significance of the differences (see Table 4).
Therefore, the results supported the idea that the
Associated negative emotions factor is distinguishable from
the intrinsic or substantive factors of the subjective experience
of guilt and has an adequate level of internal consistency.
This factor is closely related to the Anxious-aggressive factor,
while only moderately to the Empathic factor. Nevertheless,
further analyses are required regarding the internal structure
of this factor, since correlations were observed between the
errors of some of its emotions and those of the emotions
characteristic of the anxious-aggressive dimension of guilt.
These inter-correlations reflect the existence of covariation
structures that cannot be satisfactorily explained by the three
dimensions of the model. They seem to point to a difference
in the nature of emotions such as fear and disgust, and shame
and sense of worthlessness.
The M31 model explores precisely this possibility by
freeing the intercorrelations between the errors of some
emotions. Figure 3 shows the estimates obtained. The
diagram shows interesting correlations between the emotions
of the Anxious-aggressive factor and two of the emotions
of the Associated negative emotions factor. The fit indexes
corresponding to this model, shown in Table 3, are highly
satisfactory but of only relative value, because they have
been achieved following empirical post hoc criteria obtained
with the same sample. Further research should try to clarify
these relations with a wider range of emotions, alternative
factorial structures of a hierarchical nature and, especially,
different samples.
Nevertheless, from the fit indexes obtained by the M31
model we can indeed draw an important conclusion: the
proposed model has a very high fit level in the first two
factors, which are precisely those that, from a theoretical
viewpoint, were considered intrinsic to or constituent of the
subjective experiences of guilt. The source of the distortion
of the fit lies in the emotions of the third factor, which we
consider related but extrinsic to the subjective experience
of guilt. Therefore, we can conclude that the data clearly
support the central corpus of the theory on the subjective
experience of guilt.
However, in our strategy of comparing nested models,
it seemed necessary to contemplate some other alternative
model that altered the configuration of the first two factors.
That model was the ‘M32’ model, which affirmed that the
feeling of sadness was only an indicator of the Empathic
factor. This contradicts one of our main hypotheses, which
posed that sadness was an emotion common to the Empathic
and Anxious-aggressive dimensions. As can be observed in
Table 3, the alteration of this parameter had a strong negative
impact on the model’s fit. Table 4 shows that there are
significant differences between the fit of the proposed
theoretical model and the alternative model (M32). Thus,
we can also conclude that sadness is an important element
in both the Anxious-aggressive and the Empathic dimensions
of the subjective experience of guilt.
Discussion
The theoretical model proposing the existence of two
fundamental factors in the subjective experience of guilt,
one Empathic and the other Anxious-aggressive, as well as
a third factor, the Associated negative emotions factor, was
shown to adequately fit the data and to be better than other
alternative models.
The results obtained confirm the presence of two
fundamental factors in experiences of guilt (‘culpa’): an
empathic factor and an anxious-aggressive factor, both of
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Figure 3. M31 - Three-factor model-Alternative 1 (free error
covariances).
which contain the common component of sadness. The
empathic factor basically consists of the feeling of sympathy,
with the feeling of sadness also being present but with less
weight. The anxious-aggressive factor mainly includes anxiety,
anger and anger at oneself, with sadness also present but
again, with less weight. In short, the first factor corresponds
to the type of guilt proposed by Hoffman (1982, 1998) and
Klein (1973), while the second corresponds quite faithfully
to that proposed by Freud (1923/1961, 1930/1961). We can
therefore affirm that, at least as regards the Spanish experience
of this emotion, both Freud and Hoffman are right. If their
theories appear at first to be contradictory, this is because the
former focuses his attention on experiences of guilt in which
the anxious-aggressive factor is most salient, while Hoffman
focuses on those in which the empathic factor predominates. 
This conclusion may be useful for clarifying the complex
theoretical panorama surrounding the study of guilt, a
complexity due, to a large extent, to the different conceptions
that exist regarding its emotional nature. As well as this, we
should also highlight that, in our study, clear support was
found for the presence of a strong aggressive component in
the subjective experience of guilt. This aspect, identified very
clearly by Freud (1923/1961, 1930/1961), has already been
found in a number of previous studies (Baumeister et al.,
1995; Bybee & Quiles, 1995; Jones & Kugler, 1993; Jones
et al., 1995; Lindsay-Hartz et al., 1995), yet is often
overlooked. In conjunction with the results of the
aforementioned works, those found in this study suggest that
if we really wish to understand experiences of guilt and, in
particular, those of a disturbing nature, in all their complexity,
then we must pay more attention to the (other and self-
oriented) aggressive component that is so often part of them. 
As mentioned above, according to our results, a
component of sadness is present in both the empathic and
anxious-aggressive factors. This result is consistent with the
theoretical approaches reviewed in the introduction. Thus,
in her analyses regarding depressive guilt, Klein (1973)
places special emphasis on the sorrow and depressive
feelings that accompany the experience of knowing oneself
to be the cause of a beloved object’s suffering. In other
words, in addition to empathy, sadness and sorrow are also
a part of this type of experience of guilt. The presence of
a component of sadness in the more Freudian anxious-
aggressive guilt is also hardly surprising. Both Freud and
other authors have drawn attention to the relationship
between certain anxious types of guilt and depression. 
One fundamental theoretical question that remained
unanswered when reviewing the diverse conceptions of the
emotional quality of the subjective experience of guilt was
how two such different subjective emotional experiences such
as those postulated by Hoffman (1982, 1998) or Klein (1973)
on the one hand, and Freud (1923/1961, 1930/1961) on the
other, could both be included under the same emotional term.
The fact that sadness is a component (the only one, in fact)
common to both types of guilt suggests that this emotional
component may, as far as emotional quality is concerned,
serve as a point of union. And indeed, daily experience shows
us that most of the guilt experiences (both those of a more
empathic nature and those of a more anxious-aggressive
nature) include a component of sadness: sadness provoked
by one’s own acts, which the individual rejects, and by the
sudden awareness that these acts may be atoned for, but never
undone. As with sadness, in all experiences of guilt the
individual feels that something valued has been lost or spoilt. 
Alongside the emotional components mentioned above,
the study also analyzed the implication of other components
such as fear, disgust, sense of worthlessness and shame in
the subjective experience of guilt. These components, as
stated in the theoretical review, may be associated with some
experiences of guilt, but cannot be considered intrinsic to
this emotion. As hypothesized, the intensity of these
emotional components in comparison with those of empathy,
anxiety, aggressiveness and sadness was notably lower. The
results support the hypothesis that these emotions tend to
be grouped together under a third factor, which we termed
the Associated negative emotions factor because, while being
clearly distinguishable from both the empathic and anxious-
aggressive factors, it is nevertheless closely linked to the
latter. Future studies need to explore the internal structure
of this factor in more detail, since correlations were observed
between the errors of some of its emotions and those of the
emotions characteristic of the anxious-aggressive dimension:
positive correlations between fear and anxiety and between
disgust and other-oriented aggression, and a negative
correlation between disgust and self-oriented aggression.
These results seem to point to a difference between the
intervention of fear and disgust, on the one hand, and shame
and a sense of worthlessness, on the other, in experiences
of guilt, since the former correlated with those emotions
characteristic of the anxious-aggressive factor, while the
latter did not. The clarification of the role of these and other
possible negative emotions in the experience of guilt will
require additional studies that encompass a wider and more
diverse range of emotional terms.
In relation to the debate regarding the differences between
guilt and shame (Abe, 2004; Buss, 1980, 2001; Lewis, 1971;
Lewis, 2000; Smith et al., 2002; Tangney & Dearing, 2002;
Tracy & Robins, 2004) and between the more or less
equivalent terms in other languages, particularly Spanish
(Hurtado de Mendoza, 2007; Hurtado de Mendoza & Parrott,
2002; Pascual et al., 2007), it is especially important to
explore the role of shame in our model. In this study, given
that the limits between ‘culpa’ (guilt) and ‘vergüenza’ (shame)
in the Spanish context are relatively clear (Hurtado de
Mendoza, 2007; Hurtado de Mendoza & Parrott, 2002;
Pascual et al., 2007), we hypothesized that ‘vergüenza’ would
not form part of either of the two basic dimensions of ‘culpa’,
but would rather be clearly grouped within the Associated
negative emotions factor; and indeed, the data support this
factorial structure. Nevertheless, it may be that in other
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contexts, particularly English-speaking ones, shame occupies
a more central place in the factorial structure, forming part,
for example, of the anxious-aggressive factor. It would be a
good idea not only to replicate this study in another linguistic
context –again, English would be especially interesting– to
see if the results were any different, but also to replicate it
asking participants to refer to their experiences of ‘vergüenza’
or ‘shame’ alongside their experiences of ‘culpa’ or ‘guilt’
(depending on the linguistic context), in order to compare
the factorial structures underlying emotional experiences that
people label with each of these terms.
This may not only prove a great help in gaining a better
understanding of these emotional experiences, it may also
contribute to increasing awareness of the (often made) error
of making direct generalizations to other cultures regarding
their nature and the differences between them, based on
studies (no matter how conclusive) of guilt and shame carried
out only with English-speaking participants.
In short, this study supports the construct validity of our
model of the subjective experience of ‘culpa’, especially
regarding the two essential factors, the empathic and the
anxious-aggressive factors. Nevertheless, in order to confirm
the stability and relevance of the mentioned factors, new
studies need to be carried out using different samples,
instruments and alternative models. Similarly, cross-cultural
studies are also required in order to determine whether or
not these factors prove also to be the fundamental dimensions
of experiences of guilt and similar emotions in other cultures. 
Such studies may be of great help in clarifying the
emotional quality of the wide range of emotional experiences
grouped under the generic term guilt. This is fundamental
to achieving a better understanding of the diverse effects of
guilt, their adaptive nature, their implications in the field of
pathology and the moral realm, gender differences in this
emotion, etc. Many of the apparent contradictions between
the conclusions drawn from different studies would disappear
if we bore in mind that these studies focus their attention
on different kinds of guilt experiences. Thus, authors that
base their work on a more empathic view of guilt find that
this emotion has highly positive effects of great worth in
the interpersonal and moral field, with a clear adaptive value
(Hoffman, 1982, 2000; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). However,
those who focus their attention on more anxious-aggressive
kinds of experience, while accepting that guilt may have
positive effects, point out that it also involves a great deal
of suffering for the individual, is the underlying cause of
many pathologies and can severely interfere with that
individual’s relationship with others (Bybee & Quiles, 1998;
Freud, 1923/1961, 1930/1961).
It is important to continue the effort to integrate the
conclusions drawn by diverse studies in this field, many of
which are contradictory only at a first glance. Our
identification of two basic dimensions in experiences of
‘culpa’, one anxious-aggressive and the other empathic, aims
to contribute to this endeavor.
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